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ABSTRACT
Despite several attacks have been proposed, text-based CAPTCHAs1
are still being widely used as a security mechanism. One of the
reasons for the pervasive use of text captchas is that many of the
prior attacks are scheme-speciic and require a labor-intensive and
time-consuming process to construct. This means that a change
in the captcha security features like a noisier background can sim-
ply invalid an earlier attack. This paper presents a generic, yet
efective text captcha solver based on the generative adversarial
network. Unlike prior machine-learning-based approaches that
need a large volume of manually-labeled real captchas to learn
an efective solver, our approach requires signiicantly fewer real
captchas but yields much better performance. This is achieved by
irst learning a captcha synthesizer to automatically generate syn-
thetic captchas to learn a base solver, and then ine-tuning the base
solver on a small set of real captchas using transfer learning. We
evaluate our approach by applying it to 33 captcha schemes, includ-
ing 11 schemes that are currently being used by 32 of the top-50
popular websites including Microsoft, Wikipedia, eBay and Google.
Our approach is the most capable attack on text captchas seen to
date. It outperforms four state-of-the-art text-captcha solvers by
not only delivering a signiicantly higher accuracy on all testing
schemes, but also successfully attacking schemes where others have
zero chance. We show that our approach is highly eicient as it
can solve a captcha within 0.05 second using a desktop GPU. We
demonstrate that our attack is generally applicable because it can
bypass the advanced security features employed by most modern
∗Corresponding faculty authors: Zhanyong Tang and Zheng Wang.
1To aid readability, we will use the acronym in lowercase thereafter.
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text captcha schemes. We hope the results of our work can encour-
age the community to revisit the design and practical use of text
captchas.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Text-based captchas are extensively used to distinguish humans
from automated computer programs [58±60]. While numerous al-
ternatives to text-based captchas have been proposed [2, 12, 44, 50],
many websites and applications still use text-based captchas as a
security and authentication mechanism. These include the majority
of the top-50 popular websites ranked by alexa.com as of April
2018, including Google, Microsoft, Baidu, and many others. Due
to the wide deployment of text-based captchas, a compromise on
the scheme can have signiicant implications and could result in
serious consequences.
Breaking captchas2 is certainly not a new research topic. Over
the past decade, researchers have demonstrated diferent ways for
automatically recognizing text-based captchas [15, 16, 43, 64]. How-
ever, many of the prior attacks are hard-coded for a few speciic
captcha schemes, and tuning the attacking heuristics or models
requires heavy expert involvement and follows a labor-intensive
and time-consuming process of data gathering and labeling. Since
2In this paper, the term breaking captchas means automatically solving the captcha
challenge using a computer program, i.e., recognizing the characters within a text-
based captcha image.
text captchas are keeping evolving and have become more robust,
the newly introduced security features make many of the previous
scheme-speciic attacks no longer applicable [17]. Recently, some
more generic attacks were proposed [8, 10, 17]. However, these
methods only target text captchas with relatively simple security
features such as simple noisy backgrounds and a single font style.
The success of these generic attacks lies on the efectiveness of
character segmentation [11], but the recent development of text
captchas has made it more challenging by introducing e.g., more
complex backgrounds as well as distorted and overlapping charac-
ters.
This paper presents a generic, low-efort yet efective approach
to automatically solve text-based captchas based on deep learn-
ing [31, 48]. Unlike previous machine-learning-based attacks [55]
that all require a large volume of captchas (which are increasingly
di cult to gather) to train an efective solver, our approach signif-
icantly reduces the number of real captchas needed. We achieve
this by irst using automatically generated synthetic captchas to
train a base solver and then ine-tune the basic model by applying
transfer learning [48] to a small set of real captchas of the target
scheme. Our approach is based on the recently proposed genera-
tive adversarial network (GAN) architecture that has demonstrated
impressive performance on image translation tasks [22, 31]. Our
method not only greatly reduces the human involvement and ef-
forts needed in building a successful captcha solver, but also yields
signiicantly better performance in solving a wide range of modern
captcha schemes. Since our attack requires little human involve-
ment, a captcha solver can be easily built to target a new or revised
captcha scheme. This makes our attack a particular serious threat
for text-based captchas.
We evaluate our approach by applying it to a total of 33 text-
based captcha schemes, of which 11 are currently being used by 32
of the top-50 popular websites ranked by alexa.com as of April,
2018. These include schemes being used by Google, Microsoft, eBay,
Wikipedia and Baidu, many of which employ advanced security
features.We demonstrate that our generic attack needs as few as 500
real captchas instead of millions [21] to learn a text-based captcha
solver, but the resulting solver can signiicantly outperform four
state-of-the arts [8, 10, 17, 19]. Experimental results show that our
approach can successfully crack all testing schemes, judged by the
commonly used standard [10], and solve a captcha in less than 50
milliseconds using a desktop GPU.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We present the irst GAN-based approach for automatically
generating training data and constructing solvers for text-
based captchas (Section 4.1).
• We apply, for the irst time, transfer learning to train text-
based captcha solvers. Our approach reduces the number
of real captchas needed for building an efective solver by
several orders of magnitudes when compared with prior
machine-learning-based attacks (Section 4.3).
• Our work provides new insights, showing that the security
features employed by the current text-based captcha schemes
are particularly vulnerable under deep learning methods
(Section 6).
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Figure 1: Captcha security features targeted in this work.
Examples in (a), (b), (c) and (d) are samples collected from
Baidu, Sina, Microsoft and JD captcha schemes, respectively.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe the threat model and introduce the
GAN architecture.
2.1 Threat Model
In this work, we assume that the adversary can access and cor-
rectly label some text-based captchas of the target scheme. Since
our approach can work efectively using no more than 500 captchas
collected from the target scheme, we consider the overhead of col-
lecting and labeling captchas to be low. We also assume the attacker
has the computation power to generate synthetic captchas, and to
train and deploy the solver. Later in the paper, we show that a mod-
ern GPU cloud server will provide suicient computation power
for launching the attack.
Without loss of generality, to make our experiments manage-
able, we restrict our scope to six widely used security features
employed by the current text captcha schemes. These security fea-
tures (as illustrated in Figure 1), including anti-segmentation and
anti-recognition features. They are used by the top-50 popular web-
sites ranked by alexa.com at the time this work was conducted.
Speciically, an anti-segmentation feature makes it harder for a bot
program to segment the characters. The features labeled as 1, 2 and
6 in Figure 1 give some of the anti-segmentation features targeted
in this work. In a similar vein, an anti-recognition feature increases
the di culty of character recognition by using a variety of font
styles. The features labeled as 3, 4 and 5 in Figure 1 illustrate some
of the anti-recognition features investigated in the work. More
details on how these features are used by each evaluated captcha
scheme is given later in Table 1.
2.2 Generative Adversarial Networks
Our attack is based on the recently proposed GAN architecture [22].
A GAN consists of two models: a generative network for creating
synthetic examples and a discriminative network to distinguish
the synthesized examples from the real ones. We use backpropaga-
tion [28] to train both networks, so that over the training iterations,
the generator produces better synthetic samples, while the discrim-
inator becomes more skilled at lagging synthetic samples. GANs
have shown impressive results in image [31, 67] and natural lan-
guage [39, 66] processing tasks. However, due to the newness of
the technique, no work to date has yet exploited GANs to develop a
generic solver for text-based captchas.
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Figure 2: Overview of our approach.We irst use a small set of real captchas of the target scheme to learn a captcha synthesizer
1 . The captcha synthesizer is then used to automatically generate synthetic captchas (with and without background confu-
sion) to learn a pre-processing model to remove security features, e.g., noisy backgrounds and occluding lines, from the input
captcha image 2 . At the same time, the synthetic captchas (with and without security features) are used to train a base solver
3 . The base solver is then reined to build the inal, ine-tuned solver using a few real clean captchas 4 .
3 OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH
Figure 2 depicts the four steps of building a captcha solver using
our approach. Each of the step is described as follows.
Step 1. Captcha synthesis. The irst step is to generate captchas
that are visually similar to the target captchas. Our GAN-based
captcha generator consists of two parts: a captcha generator that
tries to produce captchas which are as similar as possible to the
target captchas, and a discriminator that tries to identify the syn-
thetic captchas from the real ones. This generation-discrimination
process terminates when the discriminator fails to identify a large
portion of the synthetic captchas. Once training has terminated, we
can then use the trained generator (referred as captcha synthesizer)
to automatically generate an unbounded number of captchas (for
which the characters of each synthetic captcha are known). This is
detailed in Section 4.1.
Step 2. Preprocessing. Before presenting a captcha image to a
solver, we use a pre-processing model to remove the captcha se-
curity features and standardize the font style (e.g., illing hollow
characters and standardizing gaps between characters). The pre-
processing model is based on a speciic GAN called Pix2Pix [14].
It is trained from synthetic captchas for which we also have the
corresponding clean captchas (i.e., captcha images without secu-
rity features). The trained model can then be used for any unseen
captchas of the target captcha scheme. This is detailed in Section 4.2.
Step 3. Training the base solver. With the captcha synthesizer
and the pre-processing model in place, we then generate a large
number of synthetic captchas together with their labels (i.e., corre-
sponding characters) and use this dataset to learn a base solver for a
target captcha scheme. Our captcha solver is a convolutional neural
network (CNN). The trained solver takes in a pre-processed captcha
image and outputs the corresponding characters. This process is
described in more details at Section 4.3.
Step 4. Fine-tuning the base solver. In the last step, we apply
transfer learning to reine the base solver by using a small set of
manually labeled captchas that are collected from the target website.
Transfer learning allows us to leverage knowledge learned from
synthetic captchas to reduce the cost of collecting and labeling
captchas, and to further improve performance of the base model.
This is described in Section 4.3.
'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŽƌ
EĞƚǁŽƌŬ
ŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŽƌ
EĞƚǁŽƌŬ
ƐǇŶƚŚĞƚŝĐĐĂƉƚĐŚĂƐ
ƌĞĂůĐĂƉƚĐŚĂƐ
ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂĐĐƵƌĂĐǇ
dĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞ ?
ĚũƵƐƚŝŶŐƐǇŶƚŚĞƐŝǌĞƌƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐ
ĐĂƉƚĐŚĂƐǇŶƚŚĞƐŝǌĞƌ
zĞƐ
EŽ
Figure 3: The training process of our GAN-based text captcha
synthesizer.
4 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We now describe how to build the captcha synthesizer (Sec-
tion 4.1), pre-processing model (Section 4.2) and solver (Section 4.3)
in more details.
4.1 Captcha Synthesizer
Deep neural networks typically require a large volume of training
examples to learn an efective model. Prior work shows that to
build an efective CNN-based captcha solver would require over
2.3 million unique training images [19]. Collecting and manually
labelling such number of real captchas would require intensive
human involvement and incur signiicant costs. In this paper, we
show that it is possible to minimize the human involvement and
the associated costs via captcha synthesis. The idea is that using
a captcha synthesizer, we can populate the training data with an
unbounded number of synthetic captchas (that are similar to the
real captchas). This allows the training data to cover the problem
space far more inely than what could be achieved by exclusively
using human-labelled training data.
Figure 3 illustrates the process of training a captcha synthesizer
using GANs. The training process is largely automatic except that
a user needs to provide a small set of real captchas (500 in this
work) of the target captcha scheme, and to deine the set of security
features. The security feature deinition is achieved by coniguring
a set of pre-deined parameters. Figure 5 lists the set of security
parameters considered in this work and the speciic settings for
the Baidu captcha scheme. We stress that these parameters can be
easily extended and adjusted to target other captcha schemes.
Our captcha synthesizer consists of two components, a generator
and a discriminator. The generator,G , is trained to produce outputs
that cannot be distinguished from real captchas by an adversarially
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Figure 4: Our captcha generatormodel includes a image gen-
erator and a generator network. The image generator pro-
duces a captcha image at the word level, and the generator
network modiies the produced captcha image at the pixel
level to add security features.
trained discriminator, D, which is trained to do as well as possible
at detecting the synthetic captchas.
Captcha generator.As depicted in Figure 4, our captcha generator
model includes a captcha image generator which automatically
generates captcha images according to a given parameter setting
and captcha word, and a CNN model that modiies the generated
synthetic captcha at the pixel level. We provide the image generator
and the learning engine a large number of free fonts so that the
learning engine can learn which font best suits the target scheme.
The image generator takes in the security feature coniguration
setting provided by a user and tries to ind a set of conigurable
parameter values so that the synthetic captchas are as similar as
possible to the ones from the target captcha scheme.We use the grid
search method presented in [4] to search for the optimal parameters
for a given captcha scheme. Like the image generator, the CNNmodel
learns how to modify the generated images at the pixel level so that
the resulting captcha contains security features that are similar to
the real ones of the target scheme. The similarity is measured by the
ratio of synthetic captchas that cannot be distinguished from the
real ones by the discriminator. In other words, the more synthetic
captchas that can łfool" the discriminator, the higher quality the
synthetic captchas are.
Captcha discriminator. We use the discriminator network de-
ined in [52], which is a convolutional network whose last layer
outputs the probability of an input captcha being a synthetic one.
We use batched captchas to train the discriminator, where each
mini-batch consists of randomly sampled synthetic captchas, xi
and real captchas, yj , and the target labels are 0 for every y and 1
for every x .
The discriminator network updates its parameters byminimizing
the following loss function:
LD = −
∑
i
logD(xi ) −
∑
j
log(1 − D(yj )) (1)
which is equivalent to cross-entropy error for a two class classii-
cation problem where D(.) is the probability of the input being a
synthetic captcha, and 1 − D(.) that of a real one. We note that the
real captchas in training are diferent from the one used to test our
approach.
Training.We use the minibatch stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
and the Adam solver [34] with a learning rate of 0.0002 to train our
captcha synthesizer. The overall training objective follows the gen-
eral GAN approach [52], using the L1 norm with the regularization
term λ set to 0.0001. The training objective is deined as:
Security Feature  On/Off #Options Value Range
Noisy background(s) On 5 [10, img.width]
Occluding lines On 2 {Line, Sin, Quadratic, Bezieer}
Char. Overlapping On - [-3, 10]
Character set On 4 [A – Z]
Font style(s) On 1 Solid
Font color(s) On 1 RGB (65, 103, 141)
Distortion On - {[0.1, 0.2], [0.2, 0.3]}
Rotation On - [-30, 30]
Waving Off - -
(a) Real Baidu captchas of 
different security features
(b) Synthetic parameters
(c) Generated synthetic captchas (w/ security features)
(d) Generated synthetic captchas (w/o security features)
Figure 5: Example synthetic captchas for the Baidu scheme.
Our captcha synthesizer is trained using a set of real
captchas (a). The parameter setting (b) deines the security
feature space. The trained captcha synthesizer is used to pro-
duce synthetic captchas with (c) and without (d) the security
features (i.e., noisy backgrounds and occluding lines in this
example) included.
G∗ = argmin
G
,max
D
LcGAN (G,D) + λLL1(G) (2)
where the generator,G , tries to minimize the diference between
the generated captchas and the real ones, while the discriminator,D,
tries to maximize it. During training, when updating the parameters
of the generator, we ix the parameters of the discriminator; and
when updating the discriminator, we ix the parameters of the gen-
erator. Training terminates when the discriminator fails to identify
more than 5% of the synthetic captchas. Training the synthesizer
takes around 2 days for one captcha scheme on our platform. The
trained generator network (together with the captcha image gener-
ator) can then be used to quickly generate synthetic captcha images.
In our case, it takes less than one minute to generate one million
captchas images.
Example. We use the Baidu captcha scheme to explain the pro-
cess for training the captcha synthesizer. To initialize the training,
we provide a set of real captchas for the GAN learning engine and
initial parameter values for the image generator. The generator
then produces a batch of synthetic captchas which are examined
by the discriminator. If the discriminator can successfully distin-
guish a large number of synthetic captchas from the real ones, the
grid search method is employed to adjust the parameter values
for synthesizing another batch of captchas. This process continues
until the discriminator can distinguish less than 5% of the synthetic
captchas from the real ones (see Section 6.6). When the process is
terminated, the learning engine will output the optimal parame-
ter values that are used by the image generator and the generator
network for synthesizing captcha images. As an example, Figure 5
(a) shows a real Baidu captcha while (b) and (c) in Figure 5 are the
synthetic captchas with and without background security features
produced by our approach. As can be seen from the igure, the
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Figure 6: The training process of our GAN-based pre-
processing model. The generator tries to remove as much
noisy backgrounds and occluding lines from the input
captchas, while the discriminator tries to identify which
of the input clean captchas are produced by the generator.
All the captchas used in the training are generated by our
captcha synthesizer.
security features of the synthetic captchas are visually similar to
the real captchas.
4.2 Captcha Preprocessing
Previous successful attacks have led to the development of more
robust text-based captchas that include advanced security features
like occluding lines (e.g., Figure 1a) and distorted hollow fonts (e.g.,
Figure 1 b and c). These features make the previous pre-processing
methods like [16, 64] inapplicable (see Section 6.3).
To remove these security features, we turn again to employ
deep learning to build a pre-processing model. The goal of our
pre-processing model is to remove noise and occluding lines from
the background and to standardize the font style (such as illing
hollow parts of characters and widening and standardizing the
gap between two characters - see also Section 6.3). Speciically, we
adapt the Pix2Pix image-to-image translation framework [14]. This
algorithm was developed to transform an image from one style to
another. In our case, the images to be translated are captcha images
with background noises such as the Baidu captchas (Figure 1a)
or diferent font styles such as the Microsoft captchas (Figure 1c).
Our model is also able to remove multiple security features (e.g.,
Figure 5b) at once. It is to note that we train a pre-processing model
for each captcha scheme using synthetic data.
Our pre-processing model is also a GAN consisting of a gener-
ator and discriminator. The training goal is to learn a generator
to remove security features and standardize the font style. Fig-
ure 6 illustrates the training process of our pre-processing model.
The generator works at the pixel level, which tries to amend some
pixels of the input captcha image to e.g., remove noise from the
background (Figure 6b). By contrast, the discriminator tries to dis-
tinguish the pre-processed captchas from the clean captchas that
are produced by the captcha synthesizer described in Section 4.1.
To train the pre-preprocessing model, we irst learn an initial dis-
criminator and generator using some synthetic captchas (Figure 6a).
The training captchas are organized as pairs where each pair con-
tains a synthetic captcha with the target security features enabled
(e.g., noisy backgrounds and occluding lines) and a corresponding
captcha with these security features excluded. Since the training
captchas are generated by our captcha synthesizer, it is trivial to
exclude the security features from the generation process. After
having the initial discriminator and generator, we then train them
under the generative adversarial framework. The process is similar
to how we train our captcha synthesizer (Section 4.1). Over time,
the generator would become better in removing security features,
i.e., the resulting captchas are increasingly like the clean captchas;
and the discriminator would become better in recognizing security
features of the captcha (even the changes are small). Training termi-
nates when the discriminator fails to identify more than 5% of the
generated captchas from the clean counterparts (Figure 6c). After
that, we use the trained generator to pre-process unseen captcha
images of the target scheme.
4.3 Captcha Solvers
To build a captcha solver, we follow a two-step approach. We
irst learn a base solver from synthetic captchas. We then ine-tune
the base solver using the same set of real captchas used to build the
captcha synthesizer.
4.3.1 Solver model structure. Our captcha solver tries to recognize
the characters of a pre-processed captcha image. The solver is based
on a classical CNN called LeNet-5 [38]. We have also considered other
inluential CNN structures including ResNet [27], Inception [56] and
VGG [53]. We found that there is little diference for solving text-
based captchas among these models. We choose LeNet-5 due to
the simplicity of the network, which gives the quickest inference
(i.e., prediction) time and requires least training data for applying
transfer learning. We use the same network structure for the base
and the ine-tuned solvers, but we train a solver for each captcha
scheme using synthetic data.
LeNet-5 was originally proposed to recognize single characters
but we introduce some additional layers (2x convolutional and
3x pooling layers) to extend its capability to recognize multiple
characters. Figure 7a shows the structure of our solver which has
ive convolutional layers, ive polling layers followed by two fully-
connected layers. Each of the convolutional layer is followed by
a pooling layer. We use a 3 × 3 ilter for the convolutional layer
and a max-pooling ilter for the pooling layer. We use the default
parameters of LeNet-5 for the rest of the network structures.
The output layer of our solver consists of a number of neurons,
one neuron for a character of the target scheme. For example, if a
captcha scheme uses n characters, the output layer will consist of n
neurons where each neuron corresponds to a candidate character.
Each neuron applies an activation function f(x) over its inputs. The
activation of each neuron represents the model’s conidence that
the corresponding character is the correct one. To obtain the pre-
dicted characters, we ind the neurons with the largest activations
for a given captcha scheme and map the chosen neurons to the
corresponding characters. For example, for a captcha scheme of
four characters, we will choose the four neurons with the largest
activation values and then translate the chosen neurons to the
corresponding characters.
H R H U
Synthetic captchas 
and their labels
Target captchas and 
their labels
(a) Train the base solver
(b) Train the fine-tuned solver
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Figure 7: Overview of our CNN based captcha solver. The base solver is trained using synthetic captchas (a), which is then reined
using a small number (500 in this work) of real captchas (b).
4.3.2 Training the base solver. We train a base solver for each target
captcha scheme. If the number of characters in a captcha from a
scheme is not ixed, we also train a base solver for each possible
number of characters. We use 200,000 synthetic captchas generated
by our scheme-speciic captcha synthesizer to train a base solver.
Each training sample consists of a captcha image (without security
features) and an integer vector that stores the character IDs of
the captcha. Note that we assign an unique ID to each candidate
character of the target captcha scheme. We use a Bayesian based
parameter tuner [20] to automatically choose the hyperparameters
for training the base solver. Training a base solver takes around ive
hours using 4x NVIDIA P40 GPUs on a cloud server (see Section 5.2).
The trained base solver can then be applied to any unseen captcha
image of the target scheme. Note that before passing a raw captcha
image to the solver, we irst use the pre-processing model to remove
the security features of the captcha image.
4.3.3 Building the fine-tuned solver. In the inal step, we apply
transfer learning [65] to update later layers (i.e., those that are
closer to the output layer) of the base solver using a small set of
manually-labeled real captchas. The idea of transfer learning is
that in neural network classiication, information learned at the
early layers of neural networks (i.e. closer to the input layer) will be
useful for multiple classiication tasks. The later the network layers
are, the more specialized the layers become [48]. Our work exploits
this property to caliberater the base solver to avoid any bias and
over-itting that may arise from the synthetic training data.
Figure 7b illustrates the process of applying transfer learning to
reine the base solver. Transfer learning in our context is as simple
as keeping the weights of the early layers and then update the
parameters of the later layers by applying the standard training
process using the real captchas. The ine-tuning process is quick,
taking then less than 5 minutes on our training platform.
5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section we describe our experimental parameters and
evaluation platforms.
5.1 Data Preparation
We use two sets of captchas in this work: one for training and the
other for testing. Most of our training data are synthetic captchas
generated by our captcha synthesizer. To train and test our GAN-
based synthesizer and the ine-tuned solver, we use in total 1,500
labeled, real captchas collected from the target website. From the
1,500 real captchas of a captcha scheme, we use 500 captchas for
training and the remaining 1,000 captchas for testing. We make
sure that the testing captchas are diferent from the ones used to
train our models.
Captcha schemes. Our main evaluation targets 11 current text-
based captcha schemes used by 32 of the top-50 popular websites
ranked by Alexa3. We note that some of the websites use the same
captcha scheme, e.g., Youtube uses the Google scheme, and Live,
Oice and Bing use the Microsoft scheme. The websites we exam-
ined cover a wide range of domains including e-commerce, social
networks, search, and information portals. Table 1 lists the captcha
schemes tested in this work and the target websites. We note that
many captcha schemes exclude characters that are likely to cause
confusion after performing the character distortion. Examples of
such characters include ‘o’ and ‘0’, ‘1’ and ‘l’, etc. These excluded
3Data were collected between May, 2017 and April, 2018.
Security Features
Scheme Website(s) Example
Anti-segmentation Anti-recognition
Excluded Characters
Wikipedia wikipedia.org
Overlapping characters,
Enligh letters
Rotation, distortion, waving ±
Microsoft
{live, bing, miscosoft}.com
{office, linkedin}.com
Overlapping characters,
solid background
Diferent font styles,
varied font sizes,
rotation, waving
0, 1, 5,
D, G, I, Q, U
eBay ebay.com
Overlapping characters,
Only arabic numerals
Character rotating,
distortion and waving
±
Baidu {baidu, qq}.com
Occluding lines, overlapping,
only Enligh letters
Varied font size, color,
rotation, disortion and waving
Z
Google
google.{com,co.in,co.jp,
co.uk,ru,com.br,fr
com.hk,it,ca,es,com.mx}
youtube.com
Overlapping characters,
Enligh letters
Varied font sizes & color,
rotation, disortion, waving
±
Alipay
{alipay, tmall}.com
{taobao, login.tmall}.com
alipayexpress.com
English letters and
arabic numerals,
overlapping characters
Rotation and distortion
0, 1,
I, L, O
JD jd.com
English letters and
arabic numerals,
overlapping characters
Rotation and distortion
0, 1, 2, 7, 9,
D, G, I, J, L, O, P, Q, Z
Qihu360 360.cn
English letters and
arabic numerals,
overlapping characters
Varied font sizes,
rotation and distortion
0,
I, L, O, T,
i, l, o, t, q
Sina sina.cn
English letters and
arabic numerals,
overlapping characters
Rotation, distortion, waving
1, 9, 0,
D, I, J, L, O, T,
i, j, l, o, t, g, r
Weibo weibo.cn
English letters and
arabic numerals,
overlapping characters,
occluding lines
Rotation and distortion
0, 1, 5,
D, G, I, Q, U
Sohu sohu.com
Complex background,
occluding lines,
and overlapping
Varied font size, color
and rotation
0, 1,
i, l, o, z
Table 1: Text-based captcha schemes tested in our experiments.
characters are also given in Table 1. When compared to prior at-
tacks, we extend our evaluation to 22 other captcha schemes used
in prior studies. These captcha schemes are listed in Table 4. It
is worth mentioning that while we collected the captchas from
the oicial websites, many of the captcha schemes we tested are
also used by third-party websites and applications as a security
mechanism.
Synthesizing training captchas. To generate synthetic captchas
for a target scheme, we irst initialize the security feature parame-
ters as described in Section 4.1. We then use the initial parameters
to generate the irst batch of synthetic captchas which are used to-
gether with 500 real captchas to automatically train our synthesizer.
Once we have trained the synthesizer, we then use it to generate
synthetic samples to learn the preprocessing model and the base
solver. Speciically, we use 20,000 and 200,000 synthetic captchas to
train the pre-processing model and the base solver respectively.
Collecting testing captchas. The real captchas are automatically
collected using a web crawler written in Python. Each collected
captcha is manually labeled by three paid participants (nine partici-
pants in total) recruited from our institution. We use only captchas
where a consensus has been reached by all the three annotators. In
total, we have used 1,500 real captchas for each target scheme. We
randomly divided the collected captchas to two sets, one set of 500
captchas for training our synthesizer and inal solver, and the other
set of 1,000 captchas for testing our solver. It takes up to 2 hours
(less than 30 minutes for most of the scheme) to collect 500 captchas
and less than 2 hours to label them by one user. This means that
the efort and cost for launching our attack on a particular captcha
scheme is low.
5.2 Implementation and Evaluation Platforms
Our prototype system4 is implemented using Python. Specii-
cally, the pre-processing model is built upon the Pix2Pix frame-
work [14], implemented using Tensorlow v. 1.2.1, and the captcha
solver is coded using Keras v. 2.1.2.
We use two diferent hardware platforms. For training, we use
a cloud server with a 2.4GHz Intel Xeon CPU, four NVIDIA Tesla
P40 GPUs and 256GB of RAM, running Centos 7 operating system
with Linux kernel 3.10. The trained solver is then run and tested
4Code and data will be released at: https:⁄⁄goo.gl⁄92VxXC
Success rate
Scheme
Base Solver Fine-tuned Solver
Running Time per
Captcha (ms)
Sohu 83% 92% 43.78
eBay 52% 86.6% 4.22
JD 60% 86% 43.18
Wikipedia 7% 78% 4.71
Microsoft 36.6% 69.6% 46.06
Alipay 23% 61% 3.75
Qihu360 48.6% 56% 3.10
Sina 40.6% 52.6% 42.81
Weibo 4.7% 44% 3.41
Baidu 6% 34% 41.57
Google 0% 3% 4.02
Table 2: The overall success rate and solver running time for
each captcha scheme.
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Figure 8: Real Google captchas and the synthetic versions
generated by our captcha synthesizer.
on a workstation with a 3.2GHz Intel Xeon CPU, a NVIDIA Titan
GPU and 64GB of RAM, running the Ubuntu 16.04 operating system
with Linux kernel 4.10. All trained models run on the NVIDIA Titan
GPU for inference.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we irst present the overall success rate of our ap-
proach on 11 current captcha schemes, showing that it can break all
the testing schemes ± judged by the criterion commonly used by the
captcha community [10] . We then compare our approach against
prior attacks on another 22 text captcha schemes, demonstrating
that our approach signiicantly outperforms all prior attacks. Fi-
nally, we analyze the working mechanism our approach before
discussing the implications of the attack.
6.1 Evaluation on Current Captcha Schemes
Table 2 shows the success rate given by our base and ine-tuned
solvers, as well as the average time in solving a captcha. All the tests
were performed on real captchas which are not used for training
the solvers. Since the base and the ine-tuned solvers use the same
network structure, there is no diference in their running time. For
each captcha scheme, we report the average running time across
1,000 tested captchas. We observe little variation in the running
time, less than 0.5% across test runs.
Scheme Captcha Image Ground Truth Solver Output
Sohu d4sk d4sh
eBay 934912 994912
JD BHER BFER
Wikipedia mewsboxes mewsbores
Microsoft XK6NK XK6VK
Alipay B7JK B7YK
Qihu360 s34Ea s3VFa
Sina nG3uu nG3uv
Weibo 4TXB 4TX8
Baidu WFIH WFEH
Google irgandoca igiruloca
Table 3: Example incorrectly labeled captchas.
Our base solver, built from synthetic data, is able to solve most of
the captcha schemes with a success rate of over 20%. This demon-
strates the capability of CNN models in performing image recogni-
tion. However, it gives a low success rate for some of the schemes
such asWeibo (4.7%) and Google (0%). The ine-tuned solver, reined
using transfer learning, signiicantly boosts the performance of the
base solver. In particular, it improves the success rate for Wikipedia
from 7% to 78%, Weibo from 4.7% to 44%, Alipay from 23% to 61%
and Microsoft from 36.6% to 69.6%. This result shows that transfer
learning in combination of captcha synthesis can reduce the data
collection eforts for building an efective text-based captcha solver.
Furthermore, the ine-tuned solver also improves the success
rate for Google from 0% to 3%. While this success rate is lower than
other schemes because of the strong security features like distorted
characters and dynamic font styles employed by the Google scheme.
The strong security features make it di cult our synthesizer to
generate high-quality synthetic data. This is depicted in Figure 8
where our synthetic captchas are not similar enough to the real
captchas (especially for the font styles). However, 3% is still above
the 1% threshold for which a captcha is considered to be inefec-
tive [10]. We also note that there is no prior attack can successfully
crack the current Google captcha scheme under this criterion.
Table 3 gives some example captchas that are incorrectly labeled
by our ine-tuned solver. For most of these captchas, our solver only
incorrectly labels one character and the mis-identiied character
is similar to the ground-truth character. For example, for the eBay
captcha shown in Table 3, our solver incorrectly label character
ł3" to ł9" due to character overlapping. For the Google scheme,
our solver often fails to label several characters in the middle due
to excessive character distoration and overlapping. Note that for
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Figure 9: Examples of the captcha schemes (left) tested in
prior work, and the synthetic versions (right) generated by
our captcha synthersizer. Our captcha synthesizer is highly
efectively in synthesizing captcha images.
many of these incorrectly labeled captchas, our annotators were
also struggling to recognize the characters in the irst attempt.
Finally, the running time for solving a captcha using our solvers is
negligible, taking less than 50 milliseconds on a NVIDIA Titan Desk-
top GPU. Overall, our approach can solve all the testing schemes
under the commonly used criterion [10] with a quick running time.
6.2 Compare to Prior Attacks
In this experiment, we compare our approach against four state-
of-the-art attacks [8, 10, 17, 19] on 24 distinct captcha schemes,
including the eBay and Wikipedia schemes from Table 1 and other
22 schemes. To provide a fair comparison, we try to use captchas in
total) that these methods were tested on.Whenever possible, we use
the same dataset or captchas from the original scheme where the
prior work was tested on. For those obsolete schemes (21 out of 24
schemes), we collected the test data from public datasets, or using
captcha generation tools developed by independent researchers.
Speciically, we use (1) public datasets of previous captcha schemes,
(2) online captcha generators, such as captchas.net which was
used by some of the previous captcha schemes, and (3) open-sourced
captcha generators used in the prior work.
For each captcha scheme, we collected 1,500 samples for which
we use 500 for training and 1,000 for testing. Figure 9 gives some
examples of the real captchas and the one produced by our synthe-
sizer. The igure suggests that our synthesizer can produce captchas
that are visually similar to real examples from the target scheme.
Table 4 compares our ine-tuned solver to previous attacks. In
this experiment, our approach outperforms all comparative schemes
by delivering a signiicantly higher success rate. For many of the
testing schemes, our approach boosts the success rate by 40%. It
can successfully solve all the captchas of Blizzard, Megaupload and
Authorize used in [10]. Our approach achieves a success rate of
87.4% and 90% for reCAPTCHA 2011 and 2013 respectively. This
scheme was previously deemed to be strong where the human accu-
racy is 87.4% [19]. As a result, our solver matches the capability of
humans in solving reCAPTCHA. To achieve a comparable accuracy
for reCAPTCHA, a CNN-based captcha solver [21] would require
2.3 million unique real captcha images [19].
We want to stress that unlike all the competitive approaches
which require manually tuning a character segmentation method,
our approach bypasses this process by learning an end-to-end solver.
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Figure 10: Comparing a iltering-based method with our ap-
proach for removing noisy backgrounds and occluding lines.
The iltering-basedmethod fails to remove security features
from the latest captcha schemes while our approach can.
As a result, our approach requires less expert involvement, yet it
delivers better performance.
6.3 Pre-processing Security Features
One of the key steps in solving text-based captchas is to remove
the security features and standardize the font style of an input
captcha image. In this evaluation, we compare our pre-processing
model against prior pre-processing methods on removing noisy
backgrounds [8, 10, 32]and standardize font styles [11, 16].
Remove security features. Filtering is often used in prior at-
tacks for pre-processing text-based captchas [8, 10, 32]. The idea
is to apply a ix-sized window, or ilter kernel, throughout the im-
age to remove the occluding lines and noise while keeping edges
of the characters. Figure 10 compares a previously used iltering
method [8, 10, 32] against our automatically learned pre-processing
model. Finding the right ilter kernel size for the input captchas
shown in Figure 10a is non-trivial, because the ilter either fails to
eliminate the background and occluding lines (b and c in Figure 10)
or it over does it by eroding edges of the characters (which makes
it harder to recognize the characters). While iltering was efec-
tive for prior text-based captchas, the latest captcha schemes have
introduced more sophisticated security features which make ilter-
ing no longer feasible. In contrast to iltering, our pre-processing
model can successfully eliminate nearly all the background noise
and occluding lines from the input image, leading to a much cleaner
captcha image while keeping the character edges, as depicted in
Figure 10a. This experiment shows that our pre-processing model
is highly efective in processing and removing security features
from the latest text captcha schemes.
Success rate Success rate
Captcha Scheme Captcha Example
Ref. [10] Our approach
Captcha Scheme Captcha Example
Ref. [17] Our approach
Megaupload 93% 100% Baidu (2016) 46.6% 97.5%
Blizzard 70% 100% QQ 56% 94%
Authorize 66% 100% Taobao 23.4% 90.7%
Captcha.net 73% 99.6% Sina 9.4% 90%
NIH 72% 99% reCAPTCHA (2011) 77.2% 87.4%
Reddit 42% 98% eBay 58.8% 86.6%
Digg 20% 95% Amazon 25.8% 79%
eBay 43% 86.6% Wikipedia 23.8% 78%
Slashdot 35% 86.4% Microsoft 16.2% 72.1%
Wikipedia 25% 78% Yahoo! (2016) 5.2% 63%
Success rate Success rate
Captcha Scheme Captcha Example
Ref. [8] Our approach
Captcha Scheme Captcha Example
Ref. [19] Our approach
reCAPTCHA (2013) 22.3% 90% PayPal 57.1% 92.4%
Baidu (2013) 55.2% 89% reCAPTCHA (2011) 66.6% 87.4%
reCAPTCHA (2011) 22.7% 87.4% Yahoo! (2016) 57.4% 63%
eBay 51.4% 86.6%
Baidu (2011) 38.7% 83.1%
Wikipedia 28.3% 78%
Yahoo! (2014) 5.3% 75.1%
CNN 51.1% 51.6%
Table 4: Comparing our approach against four prior attacks [8, 10, 17, 19] on 24 captcha schemes where the prior methods
were tested on. These captcha schemes include eBay and Wikipedia evaluated in Section 6.1 and other 22 schemes.
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Figure 11: Comparing font style standardization between
a state-of-the-art hollow captcha solver [16] and our pre-
processing model. Our pre-processing model is able to ill
the hollow parts more efectively.
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Figure 12: Character segmentation produced by our pre-
processing model. For each scheme, the left image is the in-
put captcha, and the right image is the output of our pre-
processing model.
Filling hollow characters. Figure 11 compares our pre-processing
model against a state-of-the-art hollow captcha solver [16]. The
task in this experiment is to ill the hollow parts of the characters.
Here, we apply both schemes to the testing hollow captchas from
Sina and Microsoft schemes. Figure 11a gives some of the examples
from these two schemes, while Figure 11b and Figure 11c present
the corresponding results given by the hollow illing method in [16]
and our approach respectively. As can be seen from the diagrams,
our pre-processing model is able to ill most of the hollow strokes,
while the state-of the-art method leaves some hollow strokes un-
illed. Therefore, our approach is more efective in standardizing
the font style. We also note that unlike prior attacks which require
manually designing and tuning an individual method to process
each security feature, our approach automatically learns how to
process all features at one go. As a result, our approach requires
less efort for implementing a holistic pre-processing model.
Standardizing character gaps. Prior research suggests that the
robustness of text captchas largely relies on the di culty of inding
where the character is (i.e., segmentation) rather than what charac-
ter it is (i.e., recognition) [11]. This segmentation-resistance princi-
ple has become a crucial part for designing text captcha schemes.
The examples given in Figure 12 suggest that our pre-processing
model is efectively not only in removing security features (like
noisy backgrounds and occluding lines) and standardizing font
styles, but also in segmenting characters by widening and stan-
dardizing the gap between collapsed characters. The high-quality
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Figure 13: How the beginning layer for transfer learning af-
fects the resulting performance of the ine-tuned solver.
character segmentation produced during pre-processing has a pos-
itive contribution to the success rate of our solver, helping it to
achieves a higher accuracy compared to existing attacks.
6.4 Transfer Learning
Recall that we only use 500 real captchas to reine the base
solver by employing transfer learning (Section 4.3). Our strategy
for transfer learning is to only retrain some of the latter neural
network layers of the base solver (see Figure 7). In this experiment,
we investigate how the choice of transfer learning layers afects
the performance of the ine-tuned solver. To that end, we apply
transfer learning to diferent levels of the base solver, by changing
the starting point of transfer learning from the 2nd convolutional
layer (CL) all the way down to the irst fully-connected layer (FC).
Figure 13 reports performance of the resulting ine-tuned solvers
trained under diferent transfer learning conigurations for the 11
captcha schemes given in Table 1. Overall, applying transfer learn-
ing to the second or third CL onward leads to the best performance.
To determine the best starting layer for transfer learning, we apply
cross-validation to the real captcha training dataset. Speciically,
we divide the 500 real captchas into two parts, the irst part of 450
captchas is used to reine the base solver, and the rest 50 captchas
are used to validate the reined solver. We vary the beginning layer
for transfer learning, and then test the reined base solver on the
validation set to ind out which beginning layer leads to the best
performance. Since we only train and validate on 500 captchas, this
process for inding the optimal beginning layer only takes several
minutes on our training platform.
6.5 Impact of Fine-tuning Training Data Sizes
In this experiment, we evaluate how the number of real captchas
used in transfer learning afects the success rate of the ine-tuned
solver. Figure 14 shows the success rates of the ine-tuned solver
when using diferent numbers of real captchas in transfer learning.
When the number of training examples is 500, our approach reaches
a high success rate. Formost captcha schemes, the success rate drops
signiicantly when the number of training examples less than 400.
Nonetheless, our approach can achieve a high success rate when
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Figure 14: The achieved success rates when the ine-tuned
solver is trained using diferent number of real captchas.
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Figure 15: How the synthesizer training termination crite-
rion afects the solver performance. Training terminates
when the discriminator fails to classify a certain ratio of syn-
thetic captchas.
the number of training examples is 500. Such a number allows an
attacker to easily collect from the target website.
6.6 Synthesizer Training Termination Criteria
Our captcha synthesizer is trained under the GAN framework, and
training terminates when the discriminator fails to classify a certain
ratio of synthetic captchas (Section 4.2). Figure 15 reports how the
termination criterion afects the quality of the synthetic captchas.
The x-axis shows the ratio (from 0.8 to 0.97) of synthetic captchas
that are misclassiied as a real captcha by the discriminator when
training terminates. The y-axis shows the success rate achieved
by the ine-tuned solver for ive current captcha schemes, where
the base solver is trained on the resulting synthetic captchas using
diferent termination criteria but the ine-tuned solver is trained
on the same set of real captchas.
In general, the more synthetic captchas that the discriminator
fails on, the higher the quality the generated synthetic captchas
(a) Overlapped characters
(b) Rotated characters
(c) Distorted characters
(e) Waved characters
Figure 16: Example captchas with single security features.
will be, which in turns leads to a more efective captcha solver.
However, the increase in the success rate reaches a plateau at 0.95.
Further increasing the similarity of the synthetic captchas to real
ones does not improve the success rate due to overitting. Based
on this observation, we choose to terminate synthesizer training
when the GAN discriminator can successfully distinguish less than
5% (i.e., fail on 95% or more) of the synthetic captchas. We found
that this threshold works well for all the captcha schemes tested in
this work.
6.7 Impact of Captcha Security Features
In this experiment, we evaluate how security features afect the
efectiveness of our solver. Having this knowledge is crucial for
designing a more robust captcha scheme. This experiment consid-
ers four common security features for text captchas: overlapping,
rotation, distoration, and waving. We exclude noisy backgrounds
and occluding lines when evaluating individual features, as the two
features have been shown to be vulnerable under our GAN-based
pre-processing model in Section 6.3. We use a third-party captcha
generator [36] to generate captchas of diferent security feature
settings. For each setting, we generate 220,000 synthetic captchas.
We then train our CNN-based solver on 200,000 captchas and test it
on the remaining 2,000 captchas. Note that we do not ine-tune the
solver in this experiment because the test data are also synthetic
captchas.
Overlapping. By decreasing the space between adjacent charac-
ters, overlapping is a widely for anti-segmentation [10]. For captcha
images of 150 × 70 pixels, when the overlapping area of adjacent
characters are 4, 6, 8 and 10 pixels (as depicted in Figure 16a), the
success rate of our solver is 65%, 50.1%, 42.6% and 25.1%, respectively.
The success rate is still signiicantly higher than the 1% threshold
at which captchas are considered to be inefective. It is worth men-
tioning that prior study has shown that if the resulting overlapping
area is greater than 6 pixels, the resulting captcha will signiicantly
afect user experience because it becomes di cult for humans to
recognize characters from the image [8].
No. Sample Overlapping Rotation Distortion Waving Success
Rate
1
√ √
74.85%
2
√ √
65.05%
3
√ √
58.8%
4
√ √
64.95%
5
√ √
82.35%
6
√ √
62.45%
7
√ √ √
57.50%
8
√ √ √ √
52.50%
9 All security features 46.30%
Table 5: Impacts of multiple combined security features.
Rotation. In this experiment, we apply our solver to captchas
where the characters are rotated clockwise⁄anti-clockwise with an
angle of 15, 30, 45 and 60 degrees. Figure 16b illustrates some of the
rotated captchas generated by our synthesizer. Our solver correctly
recognizes all (100%) the captchas when characters are rotated at a
15- or 30-degree angle. It only fails to recognize 3 (99.85%) and 9
(99.55%) out of 2,000 captchas when characters are rotated at a 45-
and a 60-degree angles respectively. Our solver fails to recognize
some captchas because some of the characters of these captchas
are largely overlapping with each due to rotation. We note that the
rotation angle used by most of the current captcha schemes is under
30 degrees, because a greater rotation angle may have a negative
impact on user experience. The results indicate that rotation alone
does not enhance the security of text captchas under our attack.
Distortion.Character distortion can confuse bot programs as two
diferent characters could look similar when they are distorted. For
example, łO" and ł0" are visually similar when they are distorted.
Figure 16c gives some of the synthetic, distorted captchas that are
used to test our solver. For this set of testing captchas, our solver
correctly labels 92.9% of the captchas. This experiment suggests
that distortion alone is not strong enough to defeat our attack.
Waving. Figure 16d shows some of the testing captchas with vari-
ous waving degrees. Our solver is able to successfully label 98.85%
of the captchas, outperforming the 93.6% success rate presented in
[36]. Our solver only fails on 23 captchas which contain characters
that are similar after waving, such as łO" and ł0", and łl" and ł1".
For some of those failed captchas, our annotators also did not reach
a consensus.
Combining security features. Table 5 shows how the combina-
tion of security features afect the accuracy of our solver. Combining
multiple security features does improve the robustness of a captcha
scheme. This can be seen from the drop in the solver’s success rate
when using two or more security features together. Speciically,
character overlapping and distortion are more efective compared
to rotation and waving, because overlapping and distortion can
result in signiicant alterations to the shape of a character. This
observation is also conirmed by the relatively lower success rate
presented in rows No. 1 to No. 4 (where overlapping or distortion
is used) compared with the 82.35% success rate at row No. 5 when
rotation and waving (but not overlapping nor distortion) are used.
Moreover, while using more security features results in a stronger
captcha scheme, it reduces the usability of captchas. For example,
our annotators struggle to recognize the captcha presented in row
No. 8 in the irst attempt. If we now consider Row No. 9, an example
with all the security features considered in this work (including
background noise and occluding lines), all our annotators consider
this captcha to be user unfriendly and fail to correctly recognize
it in the irst attempt. For all the cases presented in Table 5, our
solver success rate is above 46%, which is still greater than the 1%
threshold when a captcha scheme is considered to be inefective.
Therefore, the results of this experiment suggest that balancing the
security strength and usability of a text captchas under our attack
is non-trivial.
6.8 Captcha Usability Study
Captcha is designed to be easy for humans to recognize while
hard for bots. However, balancing the security strength and user
experience is becoming increasingly di cult. In this experiment,
we perform user study to quantify the impact of security features
on user experience (i.e., captcha usability) and the success rate
of our solver. To do so, we have conducted an online survey by
recruiting 20 participants to ill in an anonymous questionnaire.
Our participants are at the age group of under 30s and are familiar
with text captchas. In the questionnaire, we present 100 synthetic
captchas with diferent security strengthes. We give each partic-
ipant one minute to label a captcha. We divide the captchas into
six categories based on the number of characters and the security
parameters used for generating the captacha. In the user study, we
ask each participant to rate the usability of ive captchas from each
category on a 5-point Likert-scale, where 1 = very poor and 5 =
excellent usability.
Table 6 gives the criteria used to determine the captcha di -
culties and an example captcha image for each category. For each
captcha category, we also give the averaged success rates achieved
by our participants and our solver, as well as the averaged rating
given by the participants.
While using more security features increases the di culty for
a computer program to solve a captcha challenge, doing so also
makes it harder for a user to recognize the content of the captcha.
For example, the averaged human success rate for the captchas
in category 6 of Table 6 is below 70%, meaning that nearly one-
third of the time a user will enter a wrong answer for captchas in
this category. Therefore, captchas in this category were given the
lowest usability score of 2.1 is not surprising. Also, as we expected,
humans in general are better than computers at solving captchas,
and the success rate of a computer solver drops as the di culty of
Security Features Success Rate
No. Example
Anti-segmentation Anti-recognition Humans Our approach
Usability
1 English letters and arabic numerals Rotation, varied font sizes 95.25% 100% 4
2 English letters Rotation, varied font sizes 90.25% 88% 2.75
3 English letters, complex background Rotation, distortion 91% 96% 2.8
4 English letters, overlapping characters,
complex background
Varied font sizes, rotation, distortion 89.25% 86% 2.7
5 English letters Varied font sizes, ratation, distortion 79.75% 77% 2.8
6 English letters, overlapping characters Varied font sizes, rotation, distortion, wav-
ing
68.75% 40% 2.1
Table 6: Example captchas used in our user study, the success rates of humans and our approach, and the usability rating.
If we now consider categories 3 and 4 in Table 6 where back-
ground confusion is used, we ind that noisy backgrounds have a
negative impact on the user experience because our participants
gave an overaged usability score of less than 3 for captchas in these
categories. On the other hand, background confusion has little con-
tribution to the security strength of captchas under our attack. This
can be conirmed from the similar, or even better solving perfor-
mance given by our solver when compared to human participants
for captchas in the two categories. This inding suggests that com-
plex background confusion perhaps should be abandoned in future
text captcha schemes.
Overall, this user study shows that a deep-learning-based captcha
solver can achieve comparable performance for solving text captchas
when compared to humans, but balancing the security and usability
of a text captcha scheme is non-trivial.
7 DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we discuss the limitations of our approach and
the potential countermeasures for our attack.
7.1 Limitations
Naturally there is room for further work and possible improve-
ments. We discuss a few points here.
Captchas with variable numbers of characters. Our current
implementation targets text-based captchas with a ixed number
of characters, but it can be extended to captachs with a variable
numbers of characters. This can be achieved by irst predicting
how many characters are in the captcha and then selecting a model
speciically trained for that number of characters. Our preliminary
results show that we can learn a CNN model to predict the number
of characters of an input captach image with a accuracy of 89% and
70% for Wikipedia and Google schemes respectively.
Multi-word captchas. Our approach can be easily extended to
multi-word captchas too. This can be done by either treating all
words as a sequence of characters, or irst segmenting the words
and then recognizing individual words.
Extend to other captcha schemes. Our approach is generally ap-
plicable and can be naturally extended for video and image captchas
by adapting the network architecture to recognize objects from the
inputs; and favorably, the process of synthetic data generation,
model training and tuning still is unchanged. This lexibility allows
one to attack various types of captchas, not just text-based ones.
For example, to target NuCAPTCHA [2], a motion-based captcha
scheme, we need to replace our CNN solver with a model similar to
the Mask R-CNN [26]. The idea is to irst segment the video frames
into images and then recognize characters from individual images.
After replacing the solver structure, we also need to extend our
GAN-based captcha synthesizer to generate a sequence of synthetic
images (as recognition is performed at the image level). For motion-
based captchas, the key is to maintain the temporal relationships
among images, for which a temporal CNN can be useful [37].
7.2 Countermeasures
Recent studies have shown that adversarial examples generated
by GANs can confuse machine learning classiiers [57]. By insert-
ing some imperceptible perturbation on captcha images, one can
mislead a machine learning model [47, 57] and at the same time
the small perturbation does not interfere with a successful recogni-
tion of the image contents by humans. However, the perturbation
to be put on the captcha image is tightly coupled to not only the
captcha image itself, but also the captcha solver and its parameters.
To generate efective adversarial examples requires having a way to
observe the solver behavior. Doing so is di cult in practice because
an adversary is unlikely to release the solver, while a small change
in the solver structure (e.g., by changing the number and types of
some neural network layers) is often suiciently enough to invalid
the adversarial mechanism. This work shows that it is possible to
quickly learn a highly accurate captcha solver using a small set of
real captchas. This means the structure of the solver can be quickly
changed to invalid a adversarial mechanism used by a captcha
scheme. While our work does not necessarily pronounce a death
sentence to text-based captchas ± as they are keeping evolving, we
hope the high success rate achieved by our deep-learning-based
attack can encourage the community to carefully think about the
implications of this widely used security mechanism.
Numerous alternative schemes have been proposed to replace
text-based captchas. These include video-based captachas such as
NuCAPTCHA [2] and game-based CAPTCHAs [43]. The former
was shown to be vulnerable [7, 62]. The later seemly ofers some
promises but the recently breakthrough of deep reinforcement
learning in game playing may pose a threat to such schemes [42]. To
develop a robust countermeasure for deep-learning-based attacks,
one probably need to combine multiple mechanisms similar to the
multi-factor authentication protocol [33, 51]. Nonetheless, how
to balance the security strength and usability of a scheme is an
outstanding problem.
8 RELATEDWORK
Text-based captchas are a dominant captcha scheme used by
many websites. There is an extensive body of prior work investi-
gates ways to improve the security of text-based captchas, building
upon attacks on existing schemes. However, text captchas are going
through an iterative development process, just like cryptography
and digital watermarking, where the previously successful attacks
have led to the development of more secure schemes. While there
are alternative captcha schemes available, text captchas are still
preferred by many users due to familiarity and a sense of security
and control [35].
Mori et al.were among the irst attempts to break text captchas [25].
Their attack employs a set of analytical models and heuristics to
break Gimpy and EZ-Gimpy, two early simple text-based captcha
schemes. Yan et al. show a simple character segmentationmethod [63],
which counts the number of pixels of individual characters, can
breakmost of the captchas from Captchaservices.org. Later, they
show an improved segmentation method can be used to attack the
early captcha schemes used by Yahoo!, Microsoft and Google [64].
The work presented by Gao et al. targets captchas of hollow charac-
ters [15]. Their approach irst ills the hollow character strokes, and
then searches for the possible combinations of adjacent character
strokes to recognize individual characters. While are efective on
hollow characters, this approach is inefective on captcha images
with overlapping and distorted characters. Unlike our approach,
all the aforementioned attacks are tightly coupled to the captcha
scheme and hard to generalize. This means to target a new captcha
scheme, they would require human involvement to revise the exist-
ing heuristics and possibly to design new heuristics.
Decaptcha [8] employs machine-learning-based classiiers to
develop a generic attack for text-based captchas. It is able to break
13 captcha schemes but achieves zero success on more di cult
schemes including reCAPTCHA and Goolge’s own scheme. By
contrast, our approach not only gives a higher accuracy on the
schemes where Decpatcha succeeds, but also delivers a success rate
of 87.4% on reCAPTCHA for which Decaptcha has a success rate of
zero (see Table 4). A more recent work presented by Gao et al. [17]
uses the Log-Gabor ilter, a classical signal processing algorithm,
to irst extract character components from the captcha image; it
then uses the k-Nearest Neighbor algorithm to recognize individual
characters using the extracted information. Due to the limitation
of the Log-Gabor ilter, their approach is inefective for captcha
images with noisy backgrounds. For example, their approach fails to
recognize the Baidu captcha shown in Figure 1a. Recently, George
et al. presents a hierarchical model called the Recursive Cortical
Network (RCN) for image recognition [19]. The RCN is efective in
recognizing individual characters but are less efective for solving
text-based captchas when compared to our approach. Our approach
outperforms all the three captcha schemes showcased in the RCN
work (on the same testing dataset from the RCN paper) [19]. In
particular, on the PayPal dataset, our approach boosts the success
rate from 57.1% to 92.4%. Stark et al. [55] show that active learning
can be used to reduce the number of captchas required to learn a
solver. However, this approach requires having access to a captcha
generator of the target scheme, which is often not available to the
adversary. On the other hand, active learning is complementary
to our approach as it allows the learning engine to use a fewer
number of training samples to speed up the training process [45, 46].
Compared to these prior generic attacks, our approach is by far
the most efective generic attack ± it delivers a higher success rate
and can successfully attack some current captcha schemes where
others failed.
It is worth mentioning that there are also other captcha schemes
built around images [1, 3, 13, 24, 44] or audio data [6, 50]. Many of
these were proposed to replace text-based captchas. Unfortunately,
these alternative schemes are less popular than text captchas and
were shown to be vulnerable too [9, 18, 40, 43, 54, 58]. In particular, a
signiicant weakness of an image-based scheme is that the number
of images used by the scheme is typically limited. As result, an
adversary may exploit side channels to obtain and label a large
portion of the images used by a scheme [29].
As a inal remark, we would like to point out that our work
builds upon the foundations of adversarial machine learning [22, 30].
This technique is shown to be useful in constructing adversarial
applications to bypass malware detection [49, 61], escape from spam
mail iltering [5], or confuse machine learning classiiers [23, 41].
However, no work to date has employed the technique to construct
a generic solver for text captchas and our work is the irst to do so.
9 CONCLUSION
This paper has presented the irst generative-adversarial-network
based solver for text-based captchas. Our solver is automatically
learned from training examples and hence can target a wide range
of schemes. As a departure from prior machine-learning-based at-
tacks, our approach requires signiicantly fewer real captchas to
construct the solver. We achieve this by irst learning a captcha
synthesizer to automatically generate synthetic training examples
to build a base solver, and then reining the base solver by applying
transfer learning to a small set of real captchas. The key advantage
of our attack is that it needs less human involvement when target-
ing a new captcha scheme. This means that our attack can be easily
adjusted to catch up with the ever-changing captcha scheme.
Our approach was evaluated on 33 text captcha schemes, includ-
ing 11 schemes that were being used by 32 of the top-50 popular
websites at the time the work was conducted. Our approach out-
performs four prior state-of-the arts by successfully solving more
captchas. We show that our approach is robust and generally ap-
plicable, which can break many advanced security features used
by modern text captchas. Our results suggest that these advanced
features only make it di cult for a legitimate user but would fail to
stop automated programs. Given that deep learning and generative
adversarial based approaches are making great progress in solving
image-related tasks, the insights provided in this work can help
security experts to revisit the design and usability of text captchas.
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